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Perspectives

| 1 minute read

The Long Reach of CERCLA: Ninth Circuit Clarifies that Prohibition on Double Recovery No Bar to CERCLA Liability and Related Future Response Costs

On April 15, 2024, in Santa Clarita Valley Water Agency v. Whittaker Corporation, in an appeal following a jury and bench trial, the Ninth Circuit clarified that CERCLA’s prohibition on double recovery does not preclude a finding of liability under CERCLA, as long as the relief ultimately granted does not allow recovery of double compensation. The Court went on to hold that defendant Whittaker Corporation is entitled to declaratory relief under CERCLA for future response costs, regardless of whether those future response costs are speculative or even affirmatively unlikely, or ultimately not recovered by the plaintiff due to the prohibition on double recovery. The Ninth Circuit’s decision provides helpful guidance on applying the prohibition on double recovery in litigation, which is not a prohibition on liability but on a party’s actual dollar recovery.  

This clarification should streamline the ability of a CERCLA plaintiffs' ability to pursue declaratory relief and future response costs, as well as address defendants' uncertainty about the ultimate extent of their CERCLA liability for environmental contamination. For plaintiffs who have already recovered under other Federal or State laws – like the plaintiff here – this decision clarifies the scope of recovery of future CERCLA response costs to the extent that such costs may exceed a plaintiff’s prior recovery under other legal theories. And, although it may provide a temporary reprieve, CERCLA’s prohibition on double recovery will not limit, in and of itself, a defendant’s liability for costs to be incurred in the future.  

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Santa Clarita Valley Water Agency v. Whittaker Corporation can be found here

We have not had an opportunity to clarify whether a finding of liability for incurred response costs under CERCLA is precluded by § 9614(b)’s bar on double recovery. We do so now and hold that § 9614(b) does not bar a finding of liability as long as the district court fashions the relief such that the plaintiff will not recover double compensation.

Tags

environmental law, cercla